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Abstract 
The purpose of this note is to explore briefly the role that a dialectical development of 
logical understanding and consciousness plays in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
with some references to his Science of Logic. The role played by the logic of 
ontological development is emphasized. Furthermore, the role of human laboring 
activity in particular in Hegel is singled out as an area where  thinking can redirect 
itself to return from the heights of speculative thought to a this-worldly development 
of freedom through a series of internal and dialectical contradictions. In line with this 
approach, Hegel's non-atomistic characterization of the individual in society can also 
be seen in a new light. 
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 Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (PS) and Science of Logic (SL) are two seminal 
works by the great philosopher. Of the two the Phenomenology of Spirit(1807) is a 
youthful book compared with the Science of Logic(1816). However, there is a 
continuity of Hegel's philosophical project of arriving at a dialectical grasp of the 
dynamics of  "Being" with significant thematic and conceptual overlap between the 
two works. The purpose of this note is to explore briefly the role that a dialectical 
development of logical understanding and consciousness plays in these works.1 The 
emphasis will be on PS, with only some remarks on SL when relevant.2 
 It is important to see both these works in a post-Kantian philosophical context as 
well. In this particular context, among other things, Hegel was wrestling with Kant's 
particular solution to Humean skepticism which challenged the ideas of causality, 
necessity and universality, ultimately  negating the possibilities of deriving certain 
knowledge of the world through rational reflection. Hegel found Kant's solution 
through a critique of pure reason to be a partial one only. In his view, Kant conceded 
too much to Hume by restricting the possibility of knowledge only to the realm of 
phenomena and thus making it seemingly impossible to gain knowledge of the 
ultimate nature of reality through rational speculation. 
 
 PS can be seen as Hegel's early and preliminary investigation of the development of 
a reflective consciousness through using a kind of dialectical logic. More specifically, 
Hegel attempts to establish clearly the stages that an ordinary consciousness needs to 
go through in order to reach the necessary epistemological and  ontological 
conditions for embarking on further speculative thought that rejects Kant's 
epistemological and ontological  claims regarding the inability of pure reason to 
know the thing-in-itself. In this sense, his later SL pursues the logical and ontological 
                                                       
1
 There are, of course, many interpretations and exegetical pieces on PS. Jean Wahl's discussion of the unhappy 
consciousness and its subsequent influence on French thinking is a prominent case in point. There are also works 
by Hyppolite, Westphal, Kojeve, Pippin and others each with its distinctive viewpoint. Mine is, in a sense, closest 
to that of Westphal but without his theism. In terms of dialectical logic, I have been influenced by Ilyenkov's book 
by the same title. 
2
 Hegel's earlier work The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy  is also of some 
importance. But a historical exegesis of the evolution of Hegel's thought in this manner would take us too far 
afield. 
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structure of speculative thought in depth by starting where PS leaves off. SL starts 
with the idea of pure, indeterminate, immediate “being" whereas PS ends--- after 
consciousness has become fully critical and aware of itself--- with the dissolution of 
subject/object dichotomy in thought (speculative or absolute knowledge as such).  
 In SL, Hegel wants to begin without any presuppositions by suspending all 
assumptions about thought and being. His philosophical strategy here is to let the 
indeterminate thought of being unfold through a dialectical movement of 
self-generated contradictions that are sublated through the use of a more developed 
form of dialectical logic. PS is a preliminary necessity only for those who are not 
convinced that this is possible or desirable.  
 The ordinary, non-philosophical consciousness is not moved by the spirit of 
self-criticism. It is this possibility---and indeed the necessity as well--- of 
self-criticism of thought by itself that Hegel wishes to bring out. But the ordinary 
consciousness is fixated upon everyday experiences of objects, processes and 
practices. It does not see the point of challenging these already settled habits of the 
ordinary mind. 
 Hegel wants to help the ordinary consciousness by offering a ladder to the 
inquiring mind in order to finally arrive at the standpoint of speculative logic. Hegel 
believes that the “individual” has the right to demand such a ladder since the ordinary 
mode of consciousness is certain only of its ordinary modes of grasping sense data, 
perception, understanding etc. 
 Hegel shows that starting with immediate sense – certainty, a dialectical 
movement of thought can be traced through the work of many mediations which lead 
ultimately to a perceptual stage of cognition. A similar dialectical exercise with 
perceptions leads to the category of understanding. A further process of mediation and 
sublation     takes the consciousness to the next stage of self-consciousness 
illustrated through the famous master-slave figure3. In what follows, I will emphasize 
the complexities of this figure. In particular, the role of the laboring process in 
                                                       
3
 There is a large literature on this already. From a literary perspective, the rhetorical figure can be seen as an 
elaborate conceit that draws out and emphasizes certain aspects of this figure in order to elucidate how 
self-consciousness develops. The complexities of this process will be highlighted here. 
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creating self-consciousness will be a central aspect. It may be helpful to elaborate a 
bit upon these preliminary stages of passing  from the  ordinary consciousness to 
self-consciousness. 
 Sence-certainty experiences itself (i.e. in its Erfahrung) as being aware of the 
pure empirical particularity of things. At this point, the consciousness is naïve and 
experiences seemingly no mediation  through concepts or language. It looks at what 
it has before itself simply as “this”, “here”, “now”. However, through its own 
experience (Erfahrung), it realizes that the object (Gegenstand) is much more 
complex than the initial appearances. For example, "this" turns out to be not just a 
pure and simple “this”. A  complex unity and continuity of many moments are found 
to be involved when we try to think through the idea of a simple 'this'.In particular, the 
idea of 'this' also involves the idea of its dialectical negation 'not-this'. Likewise Hegel 
speaks of “now“ as a now which is an absolute plurality of nows and a 'here' that turns 
out to be a complex of many 'heres' involving also "… a Before and Behind, an Above 
and Below, a Right and Left" as Hegel reminds us using remarkably simple everyday 
German locutions. Ultimately, this dialectical movement of what is now a reflective 
consciousness at its early stages takes it to the category of perception which overlays 
sense-certainty. 
 Similar dialectical critical reflection4 on the part of the perceiving consciousness 
                                                       
4
 Here the idea of sublation(aufhebung) is important. Contrary to the popular bowdlerized version of dialectics as 
the thesis-antithesis-synthesis triad, Hegelian dialectics is the self-movement of thought where both negation and 
preservation take place continually. In SL( paragraphs 184-187), Hegel gives a very clear exposition of this: 
To sublate, and the sublated (that which exists ideally as a moment), constitute one of the most 
important notions in philosophy. It is a fundamental determination which repeatedly occurs 
throughout the whole of philosophy, the meaning of which is to be clearly grasped and especially 
distinguished from nothing. What is sublated is not thereby reduced to nothing. Nothing is 
immediate; what is sublated, on the other hand, is the result of mediation; it is a non-being but as a 
result which had its origin in a being. It still has, therefore, in itself the determinate from which it 
originates. 
Furthermore, Hegel adds: 
'To sublate' has a twofold meaning in the language: on the one hand it means to preserve, to 
maintain, and equally it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to. Even 'to preserve' includes a 
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results in a further discovery. Perception finds that its object is not just a thing with 
particular proportions and apparent color etc. Rather, it is a concrete expression of a 
force within the object. This is clearly a post-Newtonian and a post-Kantian 
development. Here Hegel is trying to push the Newtonian idea of a mechanistic force 
further and to find its limits.To grasp the nature of this force with the mind requires 
(Kantian) understanding (Verstand). The lawful nature of the realm of inner force is 
described further by the Kantian categories of universality, necessity, causality etc. 
                                                                                                                                                              
negative element, namely, that something is removed from its influences, in order to preserve it. 
Thus what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has only lost its immediacy but is not on that 
account annihilated. 
The two definitions of 'to sublate' which we have given can be quoted as two dictionary meanings 
of this word. But it is certainly remarkable to find that a language has come to use one and the same 
word for two opposite meanings. It is a delight to speculative thought to find in the language words 
which have in themselves a speculative meaning; the German language has a number of such. The 
double meaning of the Latin tollere (which has become famous through the Ciceronian pun: 
tollendum est Octavium) does not go so far; its affirmative determination signifies only a 
lifting-up. Something is sublated only in so far as it has entered into unity with its opposite; in this 
more particular signification as something reflected, it may fittingly be called a moment. In the 
case of the lever, weight and distance from a point are called its mechanical moments on account of 
the sameness of their effect, in spite of the contrast otherwise between something real, such as a 
weight, and something ideal, such as a mere spatial determination, a line.' We shall often have 
occasion to notice that the technical language of philosophy employs Latin terms for reflected 
determinations, either because the mother tongue has no words for them or if it has, as here, 
because its expression calls to mind more what is immediate, whereas the foreign language 
suggests more what is reflected. 
The more precise meaning and expression which being and nothing receive, now that they are 
moments, is to be ascertained from the consideration of determinate being as the unity in which 
they are preserved. Being is being, and nothing is nothing, only in their contradistinction from each 
other; but in their truth, in their unity, they have vanished as these determinations and are now 
something else. Being and nothing are the same; but just because they are the same they are no 
longer being and nothing, but now have a different significance. In becoming they were 
coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be; in determinate being, a differently determined unity, they are 
again differently determined moments. This unity now remains their base from which they do not 
again emerge in the abstract significance of being and nothing. 
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Thus it is through this dialectical motion of understanding the inner force that 
consciousness finally finds a dimension of itself in the things outside. It has now 
begun to turn into self-consciousness; but it is still at an early stage of development. 
 A crucial further step in the development of self-consciousness occurs when 
consciousness discovers other living, self-conscious beings. These beings validate our 
own awareness of ourselves by recognizing us. We, in our turn, must recognize them 
as well and thus validate their awareness of themselves . 
 Most importantly, at this stage through this mutual recognition, 
self-consciousness realizes that individual identity is not really that of an atomistic, 
isolated person. Individuals are formed by their interactions with others. These social 
interactions give self-consciousness a social character. Therefore self-consciousness 
can think of itself as one aspect of a “unit of…different independent 
self-consciousnesses which, in their oppositions, enjoy perfect freedom and 
independence.” This is the point where a reflective self can say: 
 “I that is We and We that is I."  
There is some danger of misconstruing Hegel as a collectivist. It needs to be 
emphasized, therefore, that Hegel is endorsing a genuine individual 
self-consciousness, but it is a self-consciousness that is rooted in a reciprocal sociality 
at the same time. In paragraph 177 of PS, Hegel clarifies further: 
Only so and only then is it self-consciousness in actual fact; for here first of all it comes to have the 
unity of itself in its otherness. Ego which is the object of its notion, is in point of fact not "object”. 
The object of desire, however, is only independent, for it is the universal, ineradicable substance, 
the fluent self-identical essential reality. When a self-consciousness is the object, the object is just 
as much ego as object.  
With this we already have before us the notion of Mind or Spirit. What consciousness has further to 
become aware of, is the experience of what mind is — this absolute substance, which is the unity of 
the different self-related and self-existent self-consciousnesses in the perfect freedom and 
independence of their opposition as component elements of that substance: Ego that is “we”, a 
plurality of Egos, and “we” that is a single Ego. Consciousness first finds in self-consciousness — 
the notion of mind — its turning-point, where it leaves the parti-coloured show of the sensuous 
immediate, passes from the dark void of the transcendent and remote super-sensuous, and steps 
into the spiritual daylight of the present.  
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The socio-historical unity of ‘We and I’ is what Hegel calls Geist or spirit, 
Ontologically, Hegel understands Geist to be the ‘absolute substance’ of individuals 
who belong to Geist”. 
 This brings us to a concrete elucidation of the mutual recognition problem 
through a consideration of the relation between the “master” and “slave” (lordship and    
bondage in J. B. Baillie's translation from which the quotes below are taken).The 
whole problem is set in the context of mutual recognition because without such 
reciprocal recognition consciousness can not ground itself ontologically.  As Hegel 
puts it: 
 Self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that, and by the fact that, it exists for another 
self-consciousness that is to say, it is only by being acknowledged or recognized …self-consciousness 
has before it another self-consciousness … it must cancel this its other. To do so is the sublation… it 
must set itself to sublate the other independent being… secondly, it therefore proceeds to sublate its 
own self. (B-229) 
 One who becomes the master “…is the consciousnesss that exists for itself; but 
no longer merely the general notion of existence for self.” (B-239) In this 
social-spiritual metaphor, the master “… is the power dominating existence.” (B-235) 
However, it is the bondsman who labors and is thus related to the world of things in 
nature. Therefore, Hegel concludes: 
 “The truth of the independent consciousness is … the consciousness of the bondsman …bondage 
will, when completed, pass into the opposite of what it immediately is: being a consciousness     
within itself. It will enter into itself, and change round into real and true independence.” (B-237) 
 Hegel is quite explicit with regards  to the role that labor plays in this 
transformation. 
“Though work and labour … the consciousness of the bondsman comes to itself…Labor is desire 
restrained and checked…labor shapes and fashions the thing…The consciousness that toils and serves 
accordingly attains by this means the direct apprehension of that independent being as its self.” (B-238) 
 One important aspect of Hegel’s illustration here is that the fundamental 
asymmetry of power prevents the above relations from being a fully spiritual one. 
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Only the emergence of a shared recognition, albeit through a life and death struggle, 
can lead to a common ideality. This is objectified in the laws and institutions that are 
the products of historic struggles. Indeed this can be called the dialectics of the spirit 
working through history. Hegel refers to the Greek world described in Sophocles’ 
Antigone to illustrate the limits of the ancient world and the possibilities of further 
movements of consciousness and self-consciousness. In the SL and in his lectures on 
philosophy of history Hegel develops these themes further. 
 We have finally arrived at the point in the PS where the unhappy consciousness 
begins to glimpse spiritual consciousness. This more developed form of 
consciousness understands itself not only as historical and social but also as 
ontologically grounded as well because of this historicity and sociality. Thus the 
self-consciousness of 'Being' itself – “substance” or the “absolute” – now is revealed 
abstractly as socio-historical . From this perspective, Hegel's later work from SL 
onwards through his lectures on the philosophy of right and philosophy of history  
are attempts attempt to make this characterization of consciousness more concrete. 
 However, at this point in PS religion – spiritual consciousness posits the divine 
being – infinite reason, logos, etc. – can still remain the object of consciousness. 
There is still alienation. God is conceived as “the deed of an alien satisfaction.” The 
divine power is separated from human power and the human self “does not find it in 
its own action as such.” (PS 477) 
 At the ultimate stage, according to Hegel, contra Kant, this type of religious 
consciousness develops into absolute knowing. This step comes with the realization 
that the power attributed to an outside God is actually the power of dialectical reason. 
This  is summed up in Begriff or Concept. Begriff is always and everywhere at work 
in both ontological being and human consciousness. Only at this point of development 
into absolute knowing through dialectical reason, does consciousness dissolve qua 
consciousness. It is finally able to transform itself into speculative thought. It is no 
longer just 'consciousness – of” with its object ‘out there.’ It is now universal 
dialectical reason and presages Hegel’s later thought in SL. In this sense, as claimed at 
the beginning of this essay, SL does indeed begin where PS leaves off. Together, the 
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two works develop systematically the ontological unfolding of consciousness by using 
dialectical logic in its full rigor and encompassing scope. 
 
Note: 
In the next essay I will discuss how close Hegel’s Logic takes us to human social 
practice, only to return to speculative thought. It was up to Marx to use human 
laboring activity as social practice as the key to a real dialectical development through 
history. [i.e. practical activity altering both nature and human nature.] I will naturally 
discuss the category division of labor (DOL). DOL is the key explanatory factor for 
(alienated) throught. 
(Key: critique of Hegel for his elevation of thought as the only active and creative 
force.) 
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